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North Carolina State Board of Dental 
Examiners v. FTC: When Will Enough Active 
State Supervision Be Enough? 
ALEXANDRA W. JABS∗ 
In North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade 
Commission,1 the United States Supreme Court considered whether a state 
regulatory board’s anticompetitive actions were entitled to state action 
immunity2 from antitrust law scrutiny.3  The Court held that a state 
regulatory board with a “controlling number of active market participants” 
must show that the challenged market restraint was “clearly articulated” as 
state policy and “actively supervised” by the State itself.4  The Court 
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 1.  135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015). 
 2.  This Note discusses the antitrust state action doctrine that provides immunity from 
federal antitrust law liability, for both state and private actors, as first articulated by the United 
States Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown.  317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943).  The state action doctrine is 
commonly referred to as state action immunity, the state action exemption, Parker immunity, and 
the Parker exemption, and these terms are used interchangeably throughout this Note.  For a more 
in-depth discussion of the Supreme Court’s use of terms to refer to the state action doctrine, see 
Jason Kornmehl, State Action on Appeal: Parker Immunity and the Collateral Order Doctrine in 
Antitrust Litigation, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 15 (2015) (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
characterization of the state action doctrine).   
 3.  N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1110. 
 4.  Id. at 1114.  The clear articulation requirement and the active state supervision 
requirement are commonly referred to as the Midcal test, as first articulated in Cal. Retail Liquor 
Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.  445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).  Under the state action doctrine, 
private actors must satisfy both prongs of the test in order to invoke state action immunity from 
antitrust liability.  Id.  The first prong of the test—the clear articulation prong—requires the 
private actor to prove that the challenged anticompetitive actions were pursuant to “a clearly 
articulated and affirmatively expressed” state policy.  Id.  The second prong of the test—the active 
supervision prong—requires that the anticompetitive conduct “must be actively supervised by the 
State itself.”  Id.  
 2016]     N. C. STATE BOARD OF DENTAL EXAMINERS v. FTC 45 
ultimately affirmed the Fourth Circuit’s decision, concluding that the North 
Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners could not invoke the state action 
doctrine because the state regulatory board did not contend that the State 
had actively supervised its anticompetitive actions.5 
The Court was correct in holding that the active supervision prong of 
the Midcal test should apply to state regulatory boards, under federal 
antitrust policy.6  Even though the Court came to the correct holding, the 
Court did not articulate clear guidance for adequate state supervision to 
invoke state action immunity.7  Because the Court could not render a 
decision on whether the North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners 
had sufficient active state supervision, the Court left the door open for the 
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) to delineate exacting standards for the 
active state supervision prong of the Midcal test.8  Consequently, a 
regulatory board must effectively act as solely an advisory board to the 
State in order to invoke the state action exemption for any anticompetitive 
actions.9 
I.  THE CASE 
Under the North Carolina Dental Practice Act,10 the North Carolina 
State Board of Dental Examiners (“the Board”) has the broad authority to 
regulate the practice of dentistry.11  The Board consists of eight members: 
six members must be licensed, actively practicing dentists; one member 
must be a licensed, actively practicing dental hygienist; and the final 
member must be a non-dentist consumer.12  Licensed dentists in North 
Carolina elect the six dentist members and licensed hygienists elect the 
hygienist member of the Board.13  The Governor appoints a resident of 
North Carolina to serve as the consumer member of the Board.14  The 
Board’s primary function is to create, administer, and enforce a licensing 
system for practicing dentists.15  If the Board suspects an individual of 
engaging in the unlicensed practice of dentistry, the Board may bring an 
action to perpetually enjoin the individual from continuing the unlawful 
                                                          
 5.  N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1116–17. 
 6.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 7.  See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 8.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 9.  See infra Part IV.B.3. 
 10.  N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-22–90-48.3 (2015). 
 11.  N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 717 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 2013), aff’d, 135 
S. Ct. 1101 (2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-48. 
 12.  N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 717 F.3d at 364. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
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practice.16  Notwithstanding the Board’s ability to enjoin the unlawful 
practice of dentistry, the Board “does not have the authority to discipline 
unlicensed individuals or to order non-dentists to stop violating the Dental 
Practice Act.”17 
Throughout the 1990s, dentists in North Carolina began offering teeth 
whitening services, often earning substantial fees for these services.18  
Around 2003, many non-dentists entered the teeth whitening market, 
offering bleaching services at considerably lower prices than their dentist-
counterparts.19  Practicing dentists complained to the Board about the 
provision of whitening services by non-dentist providers.20  Following these 
complaints, the Board investigated the provision of teeth whitening services 
by non-dentists, indicating it would attempt to stop non-dentist providers.21 
At the conclusion of the Board’s investigations, the Board issued 
forty-seven cease-and-desist letters, on official Board letterhead, to twenty-
nine different non-dentist bleaching providers.22  These letters requested 
that the provider cease and desist “all activity constituting the practice of 
dentistry.”23  Many letters indicated that the provision of teeth whitening 
products and services by non-dentists is a misdemeanor under North 
Carolina law.24  The Board also sent letters to mall operators, encouraging 
them to stop leasing kiosk space to non-dentist bleaching providers.25   As a 
result, some mall operators refused to lease or continue leasing space to 
non-dentist teeth whitening providers.26  Taking further action, the Board 
contacted the North Carolina Board of Cosmetic Art Examiners (“Cosmetic 
Board”), and requested that the Cosmetic Board warn cosmetologists to 
refrain from providing teeth whitening services.27   As a result of its efforts, 
the Board successfully halted the provision of bleaching services by non-
                                                          
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. at 365. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id.  The Board sent these letters without state oversight or the required judicial 
authorization.  Id. at 370.  The Board does not have the statutory authority to order unlicensed 
individuals to cease violating the Dental Practice Act, and consequently judicial authorization is 
required.  Id. at 364.  If the Board suspects an individual of engaging in the unlicensed practice of 
dentistry, the Board is only given the statutory authority under the Dental Practice Act to refer the 
matter to the District Attorney or to bring an action to enjoin the practice before the North 
Carolina Superior Court.  Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-40.1). 
 23.  Id. at 365. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 152 F.T.C. 75, 198 (2011).  
 27.  N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 717 F.3d at 365. 
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dentists, causing manufacturers and distributors of teeth whitening products 
for non-dentist providers “to exit or hold off entering North Carolina.”28 
On June 17, 2010, the FTC issued an administrative complaint against 
the Board for violating 15 U.S.C. § 45,29 as a result of the Board’s actions 
attempting to exclude non-dentist teeth whitening providers from the 
market.30  The Board moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that as an 
agency of the State, its actions were that of the State itself and, 
consequently, it was exempt from federal antitrust liability under the state 
action doctrine.31  An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) denied the 
Board’s motion to dismiss32 and the FTC affirmed the ALJ’s decision, 
holding that, to be exempted from antitrust scrutiny, the Board must show 
that its challenged actions were 1) pursuant to a “clearly articulated and 
affirmatively expressed state policy,” and 2) “actively supervised by the 
State,” because the Board was controlled by “participants in the very 
industry it purports to regulate.”33  Finding that the Board’s actions to 
exclude non-dentist providers from the teeth bleaching market were not 
actively supervised by the State, the FTC declined to extend immunity to 
the Board under the state action doctrine.34 
Subsequently, the Board filed a federal declaratory action in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina to enjoin the 
FTC’s administrative proceeding.35  Specifically, the Board argued that the 
FTC 1) did not have antitrust jurisdiction over the Board, 2) was 
constitutionally barred from exercising jurisdiction in a pending 
administrative proceeding, and 3) was attempting to preempt state law 
regarding the statutory composition of the state board.36  The FTC moved to 
                                                          
 28.  Id.; N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 152 F.T.C. at 199–200.  
 29.  Specifically, 15 U.S.C. § 45 declares that “[u]nfair methods of competition . . . and unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce” are unlawful, and empowers the FTC to 
prevent this type of conduct.  15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)–(2) (2012). 
 30.  N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 717 F.3d at 365. 
 31.  Id.; N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 151 F.T.C. 607, 617 (2011).  The Board also moved to 
dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the FTC lacked subject matter jurisdiction over it.  N.C. 
State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 717 F.3d at 365.  An ALJ denied this motion on the basis that state 
regulatory bodies constitute “persons” under antitrust laws and the FTC may exercise jurisdiction 
over “persons” pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 45.  N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 151 F.T.C. at 614. 
 32.  N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 717 F.3d at 365. 
 33.  N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 151 F.T.C. at 626. 
 34.  Id. at 633. 
 35.  N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 768 F. Supp. 2d 818, 820 (E.D.N.C. 2011). 
 36.  Id.  The Board argued that the FTC does not have antitrust jurisdiction because the FTC 
is only empowered to “‘prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair 
methods of competition’” and does not have the “jurisdiction or authority to take action against a 
state (or its bona fide state agencies).”  Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Preliminary and 
Permanent Injunction at 7, N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 768 F. Supp. 2d 818, 
(E.D.N.C. 2011) (No. 5:11-CV-49-FL) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2)).  The Board further argued 
that the FTC was constitutionally barred from exercising jurisdiction because, under Article III, 
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dismiss the declaratory action, maintaining that the district court did not 
have jurisdiction to decide a collateral challenge to the FTC’s 
administrative action.37  The district court dismissed the Board’s 
declaratory action, reasoning that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to 
render a judgment.38   Likewise, the district court held that the Board’s 
action was an improper attempt by the Board to enjoin an ongoing 
administrative proceeding.39 
After the district court dismissed the Board’s declaratory action, an 
ALJ held a trial on the merits.40  The ALJ found that the Board violated the 
Federal Trade Commission Act through its anticompetitive actions to 
exclude non-dentist practitioners from the teeth whitening market.41  On 
appeal, the FTC affirmed the ALJ’s findings on the same grounds: that the 
Board engaged in concerted action, which effectively excluded non-dentist 
teeth whiteners from the relevant market.42 
The Board petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit to review the FTC’s final order denying the Board’s motion 
to dismiss, on the grounds that the Board was exempt from antitrust laws 
under the state action doctrine.43  The Board argued that as a sub-state 
governmental entity, it only needed to show that its challenged actions were 
pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy.44  The Fourth Circuit upheld 
the FTC’s conclusion that the Board was a “private actor” due to the fact 
that the Board consisted primarily of market participants.45  Reasoning that, 
as a private actor, the Board could take anticompetitive actions to benefit its 
own membership, the Fourth Circuit required the Board to satisfy both the 
clear articulation and active supervision requirements delineated in 
                                                          
§ 2, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution, the federal government could not force the Board, as a state 
agency, to defend itself in a jurisdiction other than a federal court.  Id. at 30. 
 37.  N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 821. 
 38.  Id. at 824. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 717 F.3d 359, 366 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 41.  Id.  The ALJ found that the members of the Board had a “common scheme or design,” 
composing an agreement to exclude non-dentists from the market and engaged in concerted 
actions, which effectively caused providers to exit the relevant market.  N.C. Bd. of Dental 
Exam’rs, 152 F.T.C. 75, 176 (2011).  
 42.  N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 717 F.3d at 365; N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 152 
F.T.C. 640, 642 (2011).  On appeal, the Board argued that 1) there was no contract, combination, 
or conspiracy to restrain trade; 2) several pro-competitive justifications for the action outweighed 
any harm to competition; and 3) the ALJ’s proposed remedy was overbroad and will prevent the 
Board from investigating or challenging violations of the Dental Practice Act.  N.C. Bd. of Dental 
Exam’rs, 152 F.T.C. at 653.  
 43.  N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 717 F.3d at 366.  The Board also petitioned for review 
of the FTC’s final order on the grounds that it did not engage in concerted action under the 
Sherman Act and its activities did not unreasonably restrain trade.  Id. 
 44.  Id. at 368. 
 45.  Id. 
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California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. to 
invoke state action immunity.46  The Fourth Circuit further concluded that 
the Board’s anticompetitive actions were not subject to sufficient 
supervision to meet the active state supervision prong of the Midcal test.47  
Consequently, the Fourth Circuit determined that the Board could not 
invoke state action immunity protections from antitrust laws.48  The United 
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the North 
Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners’ anticompetitive actions should 
be subject to the active supervision requirement, in order to invoke state 
action immunity.49 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Antitrust laws serve to ensure a competitive marketplace.50  The state 
action doctrine provides immunity to the states, state actors, and private 
actors from liability for violations of federal antitrust laws, provided the 
actor’s anticompetitive actions are that of the State.51  Since the doctrine’s 
first formal pronouncement over seventy years ago in Parker v. Brown,52 
the Supreme Court had yet to decide when Parker immunity would apply to 
state regulatory boards.53  Consequently, lower federal courts were left to 
decide what requirements were necessary for a state board to invoke state 
action immunity.  Many lower courts presumptively allowed state 
regulatory boards to invoke Parker immunity as long as a board’s action 
fell within the policy of the state.54  Part II.A of this Note explores relevant 
provisions of the Sherman Act and details the FTC’s authority over 
Sherman Act violations.55  Part II.B explores the development of the Parker 
immunity doctrine and the resulting circuit split as to its application to state 
boards.56 
                                                          
 46.  Id. at 370. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 134 S. Ct. 1491 (2014). 
 50.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7, 12 (2012) (providing numerous prohibitions on restraint of trade 
and anticompetitive measures). 
 51.  See generally Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 
105 (1980) (holding that private actors are entitled to state action immunity, so long as they meet 
both the clear articulation and active supervision requirements); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau 
Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 36 (1985) (deciding whether a municipality’s anticompetitive activities were 
entitled to state action immunity from federal antitrust liability); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 
351 (1943) (designating state actions as immune from antitrust liability). 
 52.  317 U.S. at 341. 
 53.  See infra Part II.B. 
 54.  See infra Part II.B. 
 55.  See infra Part II.A. 
 56.  See infra Part II.B. 
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A.  Congress Enacted the Sherman Act to Preserve Free Enterprise 
Designed to combat anticompetitive action and to promote market 
efficiency though robust competition, the Sherman Act prohibits 
monopolies or other business combinations and conspiracies restraining 
trade.57  Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that “[e]very contract, 
combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States . . . is declared to be illegal.”58  Section 2 further provides that 
“[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or 
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any 
part of the trade or commerce among the several States… shall be deemed 
guilty of a felony.”59  Penalties under the Sherman Act can be quite severe, 
including civil and criminal liability.60  Under the Clayton Act amendments, 
the Sherman Act bans mergers and acquisitions where the effect “may be to 
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.”61  The 
Sherman Act also bans certain discriminatory prices, services, and 
allowances in dealings between merchants, as amended under the 
Robinson-Patman Act of 1936.62  Referred to as the “Magna Carta of free 
enterprise,” antitrust laws, particularly the Sherman Act, serve to preserve 
economic freedom.63  The United States Supreme Court deemed the 
Sherman Act to be “as important to the preservation of economic freedom 
and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of 
our fundamental personal freedoms.”64 
The FTC technically does not have the authority to enforce the 
Sherman Act,65 but the FTC does have the authority to act under the Federal 
Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”).66  The FTC Act, enacted in 1914, 
established the Federal Trade Commission.67  The Supreme Court has 
routinely held that all violations of the Sherman Act violate the FTC Act.68  
                                                          
 57.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012).  The Sherman Act was amended by the Clayton Act.  Id. 
§§ 12–27. 
 58.  Id. § 1. 
 59.  Id. § 2. 
 60.  Id. §§ 2, 15, 18(g), 21(l).  The Sherman Act imposes criminal penalties of up to $100 
million for a corporation and $1 million for an individual, and up to ten years in prison.  Id. § 2. 
 61.  Id. § 14; see also Id. § 18. 
 62.  Id. § 13. 
 63.  United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  15 U.S.C. § 9 (“It shall be the duty of the several United States attorneys, in their 
respective districts, under the direction of the Attorney General, to institute proceedings . . . and 
restrain such violations.”). 
 66.  Id. § 45(a)(2). 
 67.  Id. § 41.  
 68.  See Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 463 (1941) (“If the purpose 
and practice of the combination of garment manufacturers and their affiliates runs counter to the 
public policy declared in the Sherman and Clayton Acts, the Federal Trade Commission has the 
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The FTC Act prohibits “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices.”69  Under the FTC Act, the FTC has the power 
to “prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair 
methods of competition in or affecting commerce.”70  Effectively, the FTC 
can bring cases that violate the Sherman Act under the FTC Act.71 
B.  The United States Supreme Court Developed a Piecemeal 
Application of the State Action Doctrine, Resulting in Confusion 
over Its Application to State Regulatory Boards 
The state action doctrine finds its origins in two cases, Olsen v. Smith72 
and Lowenstein v. Evans.73  In Lowenstein, the Circuit Court for South 
Carolina upheld a statute creating a state liquor monopoly by preventing the 
sale of distilled spirits by private parties, against a Sherman Act challenge.74  
Following Lowenstein, the United States Supreme Court found that a statute 
restricting pilotage, the profession of piloting, to licensed pilots did not 
violate the federal antitrust laws in Olsen.75  In Olsen and Lowenstein, both 
the Circuit Court for South Carolina and the United States Supreme Court 
relied on the fact that anticompetitive actions were an act of the legislature 
and, therefore, an act of the State itself.76  It was not, however, until Parker 
v. Brown that the United States Supreme Court articulated the formal 
underpinnings of the current state action doctrine. 
In Parker, the Court declined to invalidate a proration marketing 
program for raisins for violating the Sherman Act.77  Pursuant to the 
California Agricultural Prorate Act, state officials developed a marketing 
                                                          
power to suppress it as an unfair method of competition.”); see also FTC v. Ind. Fed’n. of 
Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 466 (1986) (“[F]indings are sufficient as a matter of law to establish a 
violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, and, hence, § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.”); FTC 
v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 453 (1922) (“The Sherman Act is not involved here 
except in so far as it shows a declaration of public policy to be considered in determining what are 
unfair methods of competition, which the Federal Trade Commission is empowered to condemn 
and suppress.”). 
 69.  15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  See supra note 68. 
 72.  195 U.S. 332 (1904). 
 73.  69 F. 908 (C.C.D.S.C. 1895). 
 74.  Id. at 911. 
 75.  Olsen, 195 U.S. at 344–45. 
 76.  Id. at 345 (“[I]f the state has the power to regulate, and in so doing to appoint and 
commission, those who are to perform pilotage services, it must follow that no monopoly or 
combination in a legal sense can arise from the fact that the duly authorized agents of the state are 
alone allowed to perform the duties devolving upon them by law.”); Lowenstein, 69 F. at 911 
(“But by this act the state makes no contract, enters into no combination or conspiracy . . . .  The 
state is a sovereign having no derivative power . . . the monopoly now complained of is that of the 
state, no relief can be had without making the state a party, and this destroys the jurisdiction of 
this court.”). 
 77.  Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943). 
 52 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES [VOL. 75:44 
program for the production of raisins in California, in order to restrict 
competition among growers and maintain prices.78  Finding that the 
program “was never intended to operate by force of individual agreement or 
combination,” but rather, “derived its authority and its efficacy from the 
legislative command of the state,”79 the Court reasoned that the Sherman 
Act was never “intended to restrain state action or official action directed by 
a state.”80  The Court, however, was careful to note that “a state does not 
give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to 
violate it, or by declaring that the action is lawful,” and that the question 
before them did not involve the “state or its municipality becoming a 
participant in a private agreement or combination by others for restraint of 
trade.”81  The Parker decision elucidated that state actions were immune 
from liability for federal antitrust violations.82  In coming to its conclusion, 
the Court relied on the identity of the actor—private citizen or state actor—
but failed to further delineate between the two, leaving lower courts to 
decide whether Parker applies to only actions by the State, or whether 
Parker applies to any action by a municipal or subordinate state 
governmental actor.83 
1.  After Articulating the State Action Doctrine in Parker, the 
United States Supreme Court Refined the Guidelines for 
Antitrust Immunity 
Over thirty years after Parker, the Supreme Court declined to extend 
state action immunity to a professional licensing board in Goldfarb v. 
Virginia State Bar.84  The Virginia State Bar, an administrative agency 
regulating the practice of law in Virginia, published a minimum fee 
schedule for lawyers, and consequently the plaintiffs were unable to find a 
lawyer who would examine the title for a home purchase for less than the 
minimum fee schedule.85  While noting that the State Bar was a state 
agency by law, the Court refused to allow the agency to avail itself of state 
action immunity, finding that the State of Virginia had not “required the 
anticompetitive activities” of the State Bar.86   In Goldfarb, the Court 
cautioned that, even though a state licensing board may be a state actor for 
some limited purposes, being a state board, in itself, “does not create an 
                                                          
 78.  Id. at 346. 
 79.  Id. at 350. 
 80.  Id. at 351. 
 81.  Id. at 351–52. 
 82.  Id. at 352. 
 83.  Id. at 351–52. 
 84.  421 U.S. 773, 791–92 (1975). 
 85.  Id. at 776. 
 86.  Id. at 790–91. 
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antitrust shield that allows it to foster anticompetitive practices for the 
benefit of its members.”87 
Similarly, in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,88 the Court denied antitrust 
immunity to a state agency when the agency passively accepted a public 
utility’s tariff.89  The Court indicated that the connection between the 
legislative grant of power to the agency and the subordinate state 
governmental body’s use of that power cannot be too tenuous, and ruled 
that the connection in this case was inadequate.90  This holding was 
ultimately solidified in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.91  The Court granted 
state action immunity to the State Bar’s rules against lawyer advertising, 
because they “reflect[ed] a clear articulation of the State’s policy with 
regard to professional behavior,” and were “subject to the pointed re-
examination by the policy maker—the Arizona Supreme Court—in 
enforcement proceedings.”92 
2.  A Clarified Test for State Action Immunity When Private Actors 
Are Involved 
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, 
Inc., the United States Supreme Court finally had the opportunity to 
distinguish private action from state action, and to elucidate a test for when 
immunity applies.93  Under the California Business and Professions Code, 
all wine producers, wholesalers, and rectifiers had to file fair trade contracts 
or prices schedules with the State, essentially setting wine prices.94  The 
private actions were effectively authorized by the State.95  The State, 
                                                          
 87.  Id. at 791. 
 88.  428 U.S. 579 (1976). 
 89.  Id. at 590–92 (distinguishing state officials from private actors, as “unquestionably the 
term ‘state action’ may be used broadly to encompass individual action supported to some extent 
by state law or custom,” but because the Court’s holding in Parker was limited to official action 
taken by state officials, finding that the defendant, while a public utility company, should be 
considered a private actor). 
 90.  Id. at 594–95; see also City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 393 
(1978) (“A subordinate state governmental body is not ipso facto exempt from the operation of the 
antitrust laws.” (quoting City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 
1976))); Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791 (“It is not enough that . . . anticompetitive conduct is 
‘prompted’ by state action; rather, anticompetitive activities must be compelled by direction of the 
State acting as a sovereign.”). 
 91.  433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
 92.  Id. at 362.  Bates was ultimately decided on First Amendment grounds.  The Court held 
that the lawyers’ advertisement was not misleading and was entitled to First Amendment 
protection.  Id. at 384.  Consequently, the State Bar’s disciplinary actions against the appellants, 
pursuant to its rules against lawyer advertising, violated the First Amendment.  Id.  
 93.  445 U.S. 97, 99 (1980). 
 94.  Id. at 99–101. 
 95.  Id. at 100.  The Court found that the initial system for wine pricing was authorized by the 
State because “[t]he legislative policy is forthrightly stated and clear in its purpose to permit resale 
price maintenance.”  Id. at 105.  
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however, had neither direct control over nor power to review the 
reasonableness of the wine prices set by private wine dealers.96 
The Midcal Court articulated that in order to invoke Parker immunity, 
the challenged restraint must meet 1) the clear articulation prong: the action 
must be “clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy” and 
2) the active supervision prong: the conduct “must be actively supervised 
by the State itself.”97  The Midcal Court declined to extend immunity to the 
California system for wine pricing because, even though it satisfied the first 
prong with legislative policy clearly permitting price maintenance, the State 
did not review or regulate the price schedules, and therefore, the system did 
not meet the second prong of the analysis.98  Instead, the Court reiterated its 
reasoning in Parker, highlighting that, “[t]he national policy in favor of 
competition cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy cloak of state 
involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing arrangement.”99 
Since Midcal, the United States Supreme Court has refined the 
standards for each prong of the Midcal test.  For the first prong of the 
analysis, the clear articulation requirement, the actor must show that there is 
a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed “state policy to displace 
competition,”100 such that “[b]esides authority to regulate . . . [the actor also 
has] authority to suppress competition.”101 
The standard for the second prong of the Midcal test, active state 
supervision, is less clear.  In Patrick v. Burget,102 the Court highlighted that 
the “active supervision prong requires that state officials have and exercise 
the power to review an [actor’s] particular anticompetitive acts and 
disapprove of those that fail to accord with state policy.”103  The Court 
indicated in FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co.104 that the fundamental 
purpose of the active supervision inquiry is to determine “whether the State 
exercised sufficient independent judgment and control” to make the actions 
of the agency “a product of deliberate state intervention.”105  More broadly, 
the active supervision requirement asks whether the State “has played a 
substantial role” in order to protect the market from agreements between 
                                                          
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. at 105 (quoting City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 
(1978)). 
 98.  Id. at 105–06 (“The State neither established prices nor reviews the reasonableness of the 
price schedules; nor does it regulate the terms of fair trade contracts.  The State does not monitor 
market conditions or engage in any ‘pointed reexamination’ of the program.”). 
 99.  Id. at 106. 
 100.  Cmty. Commc’ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 51 (1982) (quoting La. Power & 
Light Co., 435 U.S. at 413). 
 101.  City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 372 (1991). 
 102.  486 U.S. 94 (1988). 
 103.  Id. at 101. 
 104.  FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992). 
 105.  Id. at 634. 
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private actors to further the private actor’s own interests.106  Short of having 
no evidence of state supervision, a case has yet to present itself where the 
Court has an opportunity to delineate what a certifies a “substantial role” by 
the State.107 
Since Midcal, the Court has had the opportunity to decide if certain 
subordinate governmental actors would be subject to both prongs of the 
Midcal test.108  In Community Communications Co. v. Boulder, the United 
States Supreme Court clearly indicated that municipalities were not ipso 
facto exempt from antitrust liability because “cities are not themselves 
sovereign” under the federalism principle.109  Municipalities, however, may 
be immune from antitrust liability if the State sanctions their 
anticompetitive activities.110  The Court held that the local government’s 
limitation of cable service to a certain area of the city did not meet the clear 
articulation requirement because the Home Rule Amendment, vesting 
“‘every power . . . in local and municipal affairs,’” did not implement a 
sufficiently expressed state policy with regard to regulation of cable 
television competition, but the Court left the question open as to whether 
the municipality’s actions would have to meet the active supervision 
requirement.111  In Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, the Court declined 
to apply the active supervision prong of the Midcal test to a municipality, 
reasoning that when a municipality is engaged in anticompetitive activity, 
there is little concern that the municipality is seeking to further private 
interests.112 
                                                          
 106.  Id. (“[T]he purpose of the active supervision inquiry is not to determine whether the State 
has met some normative standard . . . .  Its purpose is to determine whether the State has exercised 
sufficient independent judgment and control so that the details of the rates or prices have been 
established as a product of deliberate state intervention, not simply by agreement among private 
practices . . . .  [T]he analysis asks whether the State has played a substantial role . . . .”). 
 107.  See Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. at 638 (1992) (concluding that the State’s choice to 
exercise veto power was not sufficient supervision, and consequently there was no evidence of 
active supervision); Patrick, 486 U.S. at 102–04 (1988) (finding no evidence of active state 
supervision on behalf of the private actor).  
 108.  See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 36 (1985) (deciding whether a 
municipality’s anticompetitive activities were entitled to state action immunity from federal 
antitrust liability); Cmty. Commc’ns Co. v. Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 52 (1982) (deciding whether a 
“home rule” municipality “enjoys the ‘state action’ exemption”).  
 109.  455 U.S. at 50 (quoting City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 412–
13 (1978)). 
 110.  Id. at 51 (“The State as sovereign might sanction anticompetitive municipal activities and 
thereby immunize municipalities from antitrust liability.”). 
 111.  Id. at 52–56 (quoting Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Byrne, 618 P.2d 1374, 1381 (Colo. 
1980)).  
 112.  Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 46–47 (“Where a private party is engaging in the 
anticompetitive activity, there is a real danger that he is acting to further his own interests, rather 
than the governmental interests of the State.  Where the actor is a municipality, there is little or no 
danger that it is involved in a private price-fixing arrangement.  The only real danger is that it will 
seek to further purely parochial public interests at the expense of overriding state goals.  This 
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The Court, however, had not clearly determined if both prongs of the 
analysis should apply to state regulatory boards, though in dicta from 
Hallie, the Court predicted that state regulatory boards, similar to 
municipalities, would not have to meet the active state supervision 
requirement of the Midcal test.113  Most recently in FTC v. Phoebe Putney 
Health System, Inc.,114 the Court denied Parker immunity to a subordinate 
governmental entity, a hospital authority, on the grounds that it did not meet 
the clear articulation prong.115  The hospital authority, Phoebe Putney 
Health System, failed to demonstrate that the State had affirmatively 
contemplated its anticompetitive actions; the State had not clearly 
articulated a state policy to displace competition in the market for hospital 
services.116  Since the Court found that the hospital authority failed to prove 
the clear articulation requirement, the Court declined to rule on the second 
prong of the Midcal analysis.117  Thus, the Court had yet to decide the 
question of whether state boards should be subject to the second prong of 
the Midcal test. 
3.  The Court Failed to Delineate When a State Board’s Action 
Qualifies as “That of the State”  
Lower courts have questioned whether state regulatory boards can be 
characterized as state actors for the purpose of the state action immunity 
and whether both prongs of the Midcal analysis should apply.  The Fifth 
and Ninth Circuits have not subjected state boards to the second prong of 
the Midcal test, while the Fourth Circuit, in its decision in North Carolina 
State Board of Dental Examiners, required a state agency to show active 
state supervision when presented with the application of Parker immunity 
to a state board.118 
The Ninth Circuit held that state boards are not subject to the active 
supervision prong.119  In Hass v. Oregon State Bar, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that the State Bar was an agent of the judicial department of the 
State of Oregon, and “a public body, akin to a municipality,” for the 
                                                          
danger is minimal, however, because of the requirement that the municipality act pursuant to a 
clearly articulated state policy.”). 
 113.  Id. at 46, n.10 (“In cases in which the actor is a state agency, it is likely that active state 
supervision would also not be required, although we do not here decide that issue.”). 
 114.  133 S. Ct. 1003 (2013). 
 115.  Id. at 1017. 
 116.  Id. at 1015–16.  
 117.  Id. at 1017. 
 118.  Compare Hass v. Or. State Bar, 883 F.2d 1453, 1460–61 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that a 
state bar, as essentially a state licensing board, only had to show clear articulation) and Earles v. 
State Bd. of Certified Pub. Accountants of La., 139 F.3d 1033, 1041 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that 
a state regulatory board only needed to meet the clear articulation requirement) with N.C. State 
Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 717 F.3d 359, 375 (4th Cir. 2013), aff’d, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015). 
 119.  Hass, 883 F.2d at 1460–61. 
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purpose of state action immunity.120  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the 
State Bar was unlikely to pursue other interests than those of the State, due 
to its public accountability.121  Similarly, in Earles v. State Board of 
Certified Public Accountants of Louisiana, the Fifth Circuit applied the 
Hallie Court’s footnote, finding that the licensing board was a state agency 
and declining to apply the active supervision prong of the Midcal test.122  
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the Board of Certified Public Accountants 
was “functionally similar to a municipality” because “the public nature of 
the Board’s actions means there is little danger of a cozy arrangement to 
restrict competition.”123 
The Fourth Circuit, however, decided to apply Midcal’s second prong 
to the licensing board in the case at hand, North Carolina State Board of 
Dental Examiners v. FTC.124  The Fourth Circuit reasoned that “when a 
state agency appears to have attributes of a private actor and is taking 
actions to benefit its own membership . . . both parts of Midcal must be 
satisfied.”125  Thus, the Fourth Circuit’s application of Midcal’s active 
supervision requirement created a circuit split between it and the Ninth and 
Fifth Circuits. 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade 
Commission, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit’s 
decision in a 6-3 decision.126  The Court found that the Board could not 
invoke state action immunity from federal antitrust law for its 
anticompetitive actions to exclude non-dentists from the teeth whitening 
market.127  More broadly, the Court held that a state board with a 
“controlling number” of active market participants is considered a 
nonsovereign actor within the scope of the state action exemption.128  The 
Court reaffirmed that nonsovereign actors must prove both prongs of the 
Midcal test, 1) a clearly articulated state policy allowing the anticompetitive 
conduct and 2) active state supervision over the anticompetitive conduct, in 
order to invoke Parker immunity.129  In so holding, the Court relied on 
                                                          
 120.  Id. at 1460. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Earles, 139 F.3d at 1041. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 717 F.3d 359, 375 (4th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 135 
S. Ct. 1101 (2015). 
 125.  Id. at 369. 
 126.  N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1117 (2015) (6-3 decision). 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. at 1114. 
 129.  Id. at 1112, 1114 (first citing FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 631 (1992); then 
citing Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980)). 
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federal antitrust policy, prohibiting “anticompetitive self-regulation by 
active market participants”130 and encouraging “robust competition”131 to 
safeguard the “Nation’s free market structures.”132 
The North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners argued that its 
actions to prevent non-dentist teeth whitening providers from offering teeth 
whitening services in North Carolina garnered state action immunity from 
federal antitrust law.133  Specifically, the Board contended that its concerted 
actions were “cloaked with Parker immunity” because North Carolina had 
vested its members with the power of the State when establishing the 
Board.134  The Board further argued that sub-state entities should not be 
subject to the second prong of the Midcal test by virtue of their designation 
as a state agency, and consequently should not have to show active state 
supervision over their anticompetitive actions in order to receive 
immunity.135  With regard to policy, the Board argued that if the Court ruled 
in a manner that further limited the availability of state action immunity and 
subjected the Board and its members to potential liability for money 
damages, this would discourage active market participants from 
participating in state government.136 
In affirming the Fourth Circuit’s decision that the Board was not 
entitled to state action immunity, the Court asserted that the Board was a 
nonsovereign actor.137  While a state’s own anticompetitive actions, such as 
state legislation and decisions by a state supreme court, are ipso facto 
exempt “out of respect for federalism,”138 the Court reasoned that sub-state 
entities could not be deemed sovereign actors simply because of their 
governmental character.139  Instead, the Court considered the Board’s 
contingency of active market participants as a potential threat to the free 
market, as its actions may serve to further private anticompetitive motives 
of its members.140  Consequently, the Court concluded that limits on state 
action immunity were necessary when a state delegates its regulatory power 
and control over a market to a nonsovereign actor.141 
                                                          
 130.  Id. at 1111. 
 131.  Id. at 1110. 
 132.  Id. at 1109. 
 133.  Id. at 1110. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. at 1113. 
 136.  Id. at 1115. 
 137.  Id. at 1110. 
 138.  Id. at 1110–11. 
 139.  Id. at 1111. 
 140.  Id. at 1110–11 (“The risk that private regulation of market entry, prices, or output may be 
designed to confer monopoly profits on members of an industry at the expense of the consuming 
public has been the central concern of . . . our antitrust jurisprudence.” (quoting Hoover v. Ronwin 
466 U.S. 558, 584 (1989) (Stevens, J. dissenting))). 
 141.  Id. at 1111. 
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The Court affirmed that nonsovereign actors should be subject to both 
prongs of the Midcal test: “first, the State has articulated a clear policy to 
allow the anticompetitive conduct, and second, the State provides active 
supervision of [the] anticompetitive conduct.”142  The Court relied on the 
Midcal test, which it had previously applied to private actors, reasoning that 
the test is the “proper analytical framework to resolve” whether an 
anticompetitive action is in fact the State’s exercise of sovereign 
authority.143  The Court noted that the clear articulation prong seeks to 
analyze whether anticompetitive conduct is pursuant to state policy.144  The 
Court, however, hesitated to rely on solely the first prong because the first 
prong alone is seldom sufficient to ensure anticompetitive actions are 
actually that of the State.145  State policies “may satisfy this test yet still be 
defined at so high a level of generality as to leave open critical questions 
about how and to what extent the market should be regulated.”146  The 
Court highlighted that “[t]he resulting asymmetry between a state policy 
and its implementation can invite private self-dealing.”147  Consequently, 
the Court reasoned that nonsovereign actors, such as the Board, must fulfill 
the second prong of Midcal test to remedy concern that the actor is acting to 
further its own interest.148 
The Court distinguished its application of the state action doctrine to 
the Board from the narrow exception applied to municipalities.149  The 
Court referenced its previous decision in Hallie in which it held that 
municipalities are subject to only the clear articulation requirement and not 
the active state supervision prong.150  The Court, however, declined to 
apply this exception to the Board, reasoning that when the actor is a 
municipality, there is little to no danger that the municipality is “involved in 
a private price-fixing arrangement.”151  The Court further distinguished 
municipalities from sub-state entities composed of active market 
participants, noting that municipalities are held “accountable electorally and 
lack the private incentives” to engage in price fixing.152  The Court 
                                                          
 142.  Id. at 1112 (quoting FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992) (citing Cal. Retail 
Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980))). 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. (citing Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. at 636–37).  
 147.  Id. (“Entities purporting to act under state authority might diverge from the State’s 
considered definition of the public good.”). 
 148.  Id. (reasoning that active state supervision demands “realistic assurance that a private 
party’s anticompetitive conduct promotes state policy, rather than merely the party’s individual 
interests” (quoting Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988))). 
 149.  Id. at 1112–13. 
 150.  Id. at 1112. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Id. at 1112–13. 
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concluded that none of the justifications available to municipalities were 
applicable to the Board; rather, the Board was akin to a private actor.153 
The Court underscored that actors with state action immunity, 
specifically the State itself, could not lose their immunity based on “ad hoc 
and ex post questioning of their motives.”154  Based on this, the Court 
justified its focus on the composition of the Board and its members.155  
Therefore, the Court held that a state board, composed of a majority of 
active market participants, must satisfy both prongs of the Midcal test to 
invoke Parker immunity.156 
Even though the Court decided that the Board must meet the 
requirements of both prongs, the Court did not have the opportunity to 
apply the Midcal test.157  In the case before the Supreme Court, the parties 
assumed that the Board’s conduct satisfied the clear articulation 
requirement.158  Furthermore, the Board did not contend that there was 
active state supervision over its anticompetitive conduct.159  Accordingly, 
no Midcal analysis was required.  The Court nevertheless provided, in dicta, 
some guidance for the active state supervision prong of the Midcal 
analysis.160  The Court delineated a few constant requirements for active 
state supervision, namely: 1) the State must actually review the substance of 
the anticompetitive decision, 2) the State must have the power to veto or 
modify the actor’s decision, and 3) the state supervisor may not be an active 
market participant.161  The Court further noted that the mere potential for 
state supervision is not sufficient, even though the analysis for active state 
supervision is “flexible and context-dependent.”162 
                                                          
 153.  Id.  
 154.  Id. at 1113 (“Omni also rejected subjective tests for corruption that would force a 
‘deconstruction of the governmental process and probing of the ‘official intent’ that we have 
consistently sought to avoid.’” (quoting City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 
U.S. 365, 377 (1991))). 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. at 1114. 
 157.  Id. at 1116 (“Omni’s holding makes it all the more necessary to ensure that conditions for 
granting immunity are met in the first place.”). 
 158.  Id. at 1110. 
 159.  Id. at 1116. 
 160.  Id.  
 161.  Id. (citing Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988)).  The Court further detailed that in order 
to prove active supervision: 1) “the supervisor must [have] review[ed] the substance of the 
anticompetitive decision, not merely the procedures followed to produce it,” 2) “the supervisor 
must have the power to veto or modify particular decisions to ensure they accord with state 
policy,” and 3) “the state supervisor may not itself be an active market participant.”  Id. at 1116–
17. 
 162.  Id. at 1116 (noting that “[a]ctive supervision need not entail day-to-day involvement . . . 
or micromanagement of its every decision,” but cautioning that “the mere potential for state 
supervision is not an adequate substitute for a decision by the State” (quoting FTC v. Ticor Title 
Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 636 (1992))). 
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Turning to policy, the Court declined to entertain the Board’s 
argument that the FTC’s order will discourage citizens from serving on 
state boards that regulate their own occupation.163  While espousing the 
tradition of professional self-regulation and the necessity of experts serving 
on state boards, the Court asserted that its decision does not deny state 
boards the protection of state action immunity.164  Rather, the Court 
emphasized that its holding serves to reduce the risks to the free market 
posed by licensing boards dominated by active market participants.165 
Justice Alito, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, dissented from the 
majority, arguing that the Board is entitled to state action immunity as a 
state agency.166  Justice Alito fundamentally disagreed with the majority’s 
designation of the Board as a nonsovereign entity, arguing that the Board is 
“unmistakably a state agency created by the state legislature to serve a 
prescribed regulatory purpose and to do so using the State’s power.”167  
Additionally, the dissent asserted that “the Court goes astray because it 
forgets the origin of the Parker doctrine” and misapplies the Midcal test, 
which should only be applied in the case of a private entity.168  Further 
noting the practical problems of the majority’s holding, the dissent 
struggled with the majority’s lack of clarity as to how states should adjust to 
comply with the majority’s ruling and potentially alter the composition of 
members on state regulatory boards.169  Justice Alito also questioned why 
the majority found it necessary to solely inquire into the structure of a state 
regulatory board as a basis for antitrust immunity.170  For Justice Alito, the 
majority created a new standard that failed to conform to the origins of the 
Parker doctrine and “our traditional respect for federalism and state 
sovereignty.”171 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade 
Commission, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the 
                                                          
 163.  Id. at 1115–16. 
 164.  Id.  
 165.  Id. at 1116. 
 166.  Id. at 1117–18 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 167.  Id. at 1119–20 (“North Carolina did not authorize a private entity to enter into an 
anticompetitive arrangement; rather, North Carolina created a state agency.”). 
 168.  Id. at 1120–21 (“Nothing in Parker supports the type of inquiry that the Court now 
prescribes,” rather “the Court crafts a test . . . [that] treats these state agencies like private 
entities.”). 
 169.  Id. at 1122–23.  Justice Alito highlights the issues with defining the majority’s terms in 
its holding, inquiring into what constitutes a controlling number and when is a board member 
considered an active market participant.  Id. at 1123. 
 170.  Id. (questioning the majority’s focus on the composition of the board to alleviate its 
concerns that regulatory capture has occurred).  
 171.  Id. 
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Fourth Circuit, holding that state action immunity does not presumptively 
apply to state boards.172  In so holding, the Court affirmed that when a 
controlling number of board members are active market participants in the 
occupation that the board regulates, the board is a nonsovereign entity.173  
Accordingly, when a state regulatory board has a controlling number of 
active market participants, the board must satisfy both prongs of the Midcal 
test in order to invoke state action antitrust immunity.174  Even though the 
Court came to the correct holding under federal antitrust policy, the Court 
did not delineate a clear standard for the active supervision requirement.  
Consequently, subordinate governmental entities are left to question when 
enough active supervision is enough.  Part IV.A. of this Note discusses how 
the Court’s holding aligns with federal antitrust policy,175 while Part IV.B 
argues that the Court’s and FTC’s guidance on the active supervision prong 
places a chilling effect on state regulatory boards.  Part IV.B also proposes 
a solution to the cumbersome FTC requirements for active state 
supervision.176 
A.  The Court Came to the Correct Holding Under Federal Antitrust 
Policy 
Federal antitrust law is a fundamental part of safeguarding our 
Nation’s free market economy.177  An open marketplace with aggressive 
competition among sellers seeks to ensure that the market produces lower 
prices and higher quality products, as well as more choice and greater 
innovation.178  In order to ensure a vibrant economy, Congress and the FTC 
sought to develop a regulatory scheme to protect free and open markets 
from threats of anticompetitive conduct and further actions within the 
public interest.179  The states are permitted to regulate their markets in an 
                                                          
 172.  Id. at 1114 (majority opinion). 
 173.  Id. at 1113–14. 
 174.  Id. at 1114. 
 175.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 176.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 177.  See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1109 (2015) (“Federal 
antitrust law is a central safeguard for the Nation’s free market structures.”).  But see Einer 
Richard Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 HARV. L. REV. 667, 698 (1991) 
(highlighting that the “Sherman Act was directed at one central evil.  Businesses were combining 
to restrain competition in order to charge high rates . . . and reap monopoly profits” but noting that 
there is little indication that “Congress viewed regulation of competition as inherently unwise” or 
criticized governmental restraints on competition). 
 178.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, GUIDE TO THE ANTITRUST LAWS, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws (last visited Feb. 9, 2016). 
 179.  Id.; see Elhauge, supra note 177, at 697–701 (arguing that Congress considered the 
public interest at the heart of the Sherman Act and fundamentally was concerned about financially 
interested decisionmakers imposing restraints (first citing 21 CONG. REC. 2728 (1890); then citing 
20 CONG. REC. 1458 (1889); and then citing 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890))). 
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anticompetitive manner under our dual system of Government.180  
However, it would be an “impermissible burden,” at the expense of other 
fundamental state values, if the states were required to conform to every 
mandate of the Sherman Act in enacting every law or policy.181 
Congress never suggested that it intended to preempt state and local 
law simply because that law interferes with competitive markets, even 
though Congress could do so under the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution.182 The state action exemption, a judicially created doctrine, 
serves “to avoid conflicts between state sovereignty and the Nation’s 
commitment to a policy of robust competition.”183  Yet state action 
immunity is strongly disfavored under the policies of free enterprise and 
economic competition embodied in federal antitrust laws.184  When the 
State delegates its power to sub-state entities, or even private actors, to 
regulate the market, one very serious threat to the free market arises: the 
potential for private anticompetitive motives.185  Consequently, Parker 
immunity should be limited to instances where the actions are an exercise 
of the State’s sovereign authority.186  In turn, some form of enforcement 
mechanism or limitation is necessary to ensure that actions of a sub-state 
                                                          
 180.  HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND 
ITS PRACTICE 739 (3d ed. 2005). 
 181.  N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1109–10 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Governor 
of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 133 (1978); Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of 
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 182.  HOVENKAMP, supra note 180, at 736. 
 183.  N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1110. 
 184.  See FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003, 1010 (2013) (“[G]iven the 
fundamental national values of free enterprise and economic competition that are embodied in the 
federal antitrust laws, ‘state action immunity is disfavored, much as are repeals by implication.’” 
(quoting FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 636 (1992))). 
 185.  N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1111 (noting that “[d]ual allegiances are 
not always apparent to an actor”). 
 186.  City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 374–75 (1991) 
(“[I]mmunity does not necessarily obtain where the State acts not in a regulatory capacity but as a 
commercial participant in a given market.”); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 584 (1984) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The risk that private regulation of market entry, prices, or output may be 
designed to confer monopoly profits on members of an industry at the expense of the consuming 
public has been the central concern of . . . our antitrust jurisprudence.”); see also Merrick B. 
Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the Political Process, 96 YALE L.J. 
486, 500 (1987) (“[T]he Court did not believe Congress had intended the Sherman Act to ‘nullify’ 
a state’s regulation of its own economy; on the other hand, it was equally sure that Congress 
would not have permitted a state to nullify the Sherman Act itself by ‘authorizing’ private parties 
‘to violate’ the Act ‘or by declaring that their action is lawful.’” (quoting Parker v. Brown, 317 
U.S. 341, 351 (1943))). 
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entity, to which the State has delegated its authority, are not a result of 
private self-dealing.187 
In North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners, the Court 
provided an analytical framework to determine whether the actions of a 
state board were that of the State.188  The first prong, whether the State has 
articulated a clear policy to allow the anticompetitive conduct, seeks to 
decipher where the State has actually delegated the authority to act or 
regulate anticompetitively.189  However, the use of this first prong alone is 
inconsistent with antitrust policy because it is insufficient to resolve the 
threshold question of “whether an anticompetitive policy is indeed the 
policy of a State.”190  An anticompetitive policy could withstand this test, 
since most statutory grants of authority are defined with a high level of 
generality and “it cannot alone ensure . . . that particular anticompetitive 
conduct has been approved by the State.”191  Therefore, the second prong of 
the Midcal test, requiring active state supervision, is necessary to ensure 
that actors are not furthering their own interests, but rather the policy of the 
State, by engaging in anticompetitive conduct.192  Consequently, the Midcal 
test satisfies antitrust policy by limiting the application of state action 
immunity to instances where the actor is acting pursuant to state policy and 
the public interest. 
B.  The Supreme Court Could Not Delineate Clear Guidance for 
Sufficient Active Supervision 
While the Court came to the correct holding, under federal antitrust 
policy, the Court could not delineate a clear standard for active 
supervision.193  In North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners, the 
Supreme Court did not rule on whether the Board had sufficiently met this 
prong because the Board did not contend that it had active state supervision 
over its mailing of cease-and-desist letters.194  Instead, the Court proffered 
some guidance for the second prong of the Midcal test.195  In announcing 
that the adequacy of supervision “will depend on all the circumstances of a 
case,” the Court failed to clarify what is in fact adequate.196 
                                                          
 187.  Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105–06 (1980); 
see Elhauge, supra note 177, at 701–03 (warning that the real concern is financially interested 
actors but this does not confer a complete prohibition on anticompetitive regulation). 
 188.  N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1112. 
 189.  Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. at 372. 
 190.  N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1112. 
 191.  FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 636–37 (1992).  
 192.  Id.; Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100–01 (1988). 
 193.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 194.  N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1116. 
 195.  See supra notes 160–162 and accompanying text.  
 196.  N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1116–17. 
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Following the Court’s decision in North Carolina State Board of 
Dental Examiners, the FTC issued guidance as to what the FTC would 
consider adequate for the active state supervision.197  The breadth of the 
holding in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners permitted the 
FTC to take a very conservative stance with its requirements for active state 
supervision.  Part IV.B.1 of this Note recounts the Court’s limited guidance 
regarding the active supervision requirement.198  Part IV.B.2 details the 
FTC’s requirements for active state supervision,199 while Part IV.B.3 
illustrates how the Court’s inability to articulate a clear standard, when 
coupled with the FTC’s guidance, effectively renders a regulatory board as 
an advisory board in order to invoke state action immunity.200  Finally, Part 
IV.B.4 proposes that simple review by an independent state commission 
should meet the standard for the clear articulation requirement. 
1.  The Supreme Court Created an Amorphous Active State 
Supervision Requirement 
In North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners, the Supreme 
Court noted, in dicta, that the active state supervision requirement is 
“flexible and context-dependent.”201  The Court identified a “few constant 
requirements” of active state supervision that it had previously indicated in 
Patrick v. Burget and FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co.202  Specifically, the 
Court highlighted that 1) “[t]he supervisor must review the substance of the 
anticompetitive decision, not merely the procedures to produce it,” 2) “the 
supervisor must have the power to veto or modify particular decisions to 
ensure they accord with state policy,” and 3) “the state supervisor may not 
itself be an active market participant.”203  Furthermore, the “mere potential” 
for supervision is not sufficient to constitute active state supervision.204  
More broadly, a state’s supervisory mechanisms must be sufficient to 
provide a “realistic assurance” that a board’s actions promote state 
policy.205 
                                                          
 197.  FTC Staff Guidance on Active Supervision of State Regulatory Boards Controlled by 
Market Participants, FED. TRADE COMM’N 1 (2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/competition-policy-
guidance/active_supervision_of_state_boards.pdf [hereinafter FTC Guidance]. 
 198.  See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 199.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 200.  See infra Part IV.B.3. 
 201.  N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1116. 
 202.  Id.; FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 638 (1992); Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 
102–03 (1988). 
 203.  N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1116–17 (citing Patrick, 486 U.S. at 102–
03; Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. at 638). 
 204.  Id. at 1116. 
 205.  Id. (citing Patrick, 486 U.S. at 100–01). 
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Even though the Court’s guidance gives some structure to the active 
supervision prong of the Midcal analysis, there are questions remaining as 
to the specifics of the active supervision assessment.  Is it sufficient for an 
agency secretary to review the board’s actions or does the action need to be 
subject to the bureaucratic process of the agency?  What is sufficient for 
reviewing the substance of the decision?  Does the review require a hearing 
or a form of public input?  Does this include reviewing massive amounts of 
data on the effects of the decision?  Does the supervisor need to routinely 
review the board’s actions or is one independent review sufficient?  While 
not an exhaustive list of the questions left open after the Court’s decision, 
these are indicative of the questions facing the states.206  Consequently, the 
Court’s dicta, perhaps intended as a stopgap until it could reach the issue of 
the active supervision prong on the merits of a case before it, left a vast 
amount of regulatory space for the FTC. 
2.  The FTC Provided Unrealistic Requirements for Active State 
Supervision 
Notably, the Court’s holding in North Carolina State Board of Dental 
Examiners is limited to those actions taken by regulatory boards that violate 
federal antitrust laws.207  Generally, states delegate authority to regulatory 
boards to determine licensing requirements, disciplinary licensing actions, 
and ultimately who may enter the market for a given occupation.208  Today, 
licensing is required for over 800 occupations, including traditionally 
regulated professions, such as doctors, as well as historically unregulated 
professions, such as hair braiders.209  Consequently, many regulatory board 
actions have the propensity to violate antitrust laws by restricting entry into 
the market a board regulates.210  In order to invoke state action immunity, 
the first step, following North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners, is 
to decipher whether a “controlling number” of active market participants 
                                                          
 206.  See id. at 1123 (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing questions left open from the Court’s 
adoption of a “crude test for capture” and noting that “[t]he answers to these questions are not 
obvious, but the States must predict the answers”). 
 207.  See FTC Guidance, supra note 197, at 1 (“While most regulatory actions taken by state 
actors will not implicate antitrust concerns, some will.”). 
 208.  See id. (“States have created a large number of regulatory boards with the authority to 
determine who may engage in an occupation (e.g., by issuing or withholding a license), and also 
to set the rule and regulations governing that occupation.”). 
 209.  Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations 
Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1096, 1102 (2014); see, e.g., Jacob Goldstein, 
So You Think You Can Be a Hair Braider?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 17, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/magazine/so-you-think-you-can-be-a-hair-braider.html?_r=0 
(describing the difficulty of obtaining a license in the hair braider profession). 
 210.  See Edlin & Haw, supra note 209, at 1096 (stating that “[m]any boards have abused their 
power to insulate incumbents from competition”). 
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are decision-makers the board.211  If a regulatory board has a controlling 
number of active market participants, the board must show both Midcal’s 
clear articulation and active supervision requirements.212  If, however, the 
regulatory board does not have a controlling number of active market 
participants, the Court’s opinion is nebulous as to whether the board must 
satisfy the active supervision prong.213 
As Justice Alito inquired in his dissent in North Carolina State Board 
of Dental Examiners, how does one define a “controlling number of active 
market participants?”214  In its guidance, the FTC defines an active market 
participant as a person who is either 1) “licensed by the board,” or 2) 
“provides any service that is subject to the regulatory authority of the 
board.”215  The FTC further refines this definition to broadly cover any 
person participating in any profession or occupational subspecialty that the 
board regulates, even though he or she may have temporarily suspended 
active participation.216  Additionally, the method by which a board member 
is selected to serve on a state regulatory board, whether appointed or 
elected, is irrelevant to the active market participant analysis.217 
The FTC defines a “controlling number” as when the active market 
participants control the decision itself.218  To clarify, a controlling number 
is not necessarily a numerical majority.219  Instead, the FTC will rigorously 
evaluate 1) “the structure of the regulatory board,” 2) “the rules governing 
the board’s authority,” 3) “[w]hether active market participants have veto 
power over the board’s regulatory decisions,” and 4) whether other board 
members either generally defer to the active market participants or are not 
sufficiently informed regarding the board’s business.220 
                                                          
 211.  N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1114 (majority opinion).  But cf. id. at 
1123 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that the “controlling number” test is not clearly defined by the 
majority opinion and will have to be sorted out by lower courts). 
 212.  Id. at 1114 (majority opinion). 
 213.  This question was not addressed by the majority.  Justice Alito, however, questioned this 
structural delineation as a basis for granting state action immunity.  Id. at 1122–23 (Alito, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that regulatory capture can occur in many ways and questioning why the 
Court “ask[s] only whether the members of a board are active market participants”). 
 214.  Id. at 1123 (questioning the meaning of a “controlling number”); Kate Ortbahn, Note, 
The Root Canal of Antitrust Immunity: North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 
94 N.C. L. REV. ADDENDUM 1, 13 (2015) (“[S]tate legislatures (and reviewing courts) could 
reasonably come to vastly different calculations of what a ‘controlling number’ equals.”). 
 215.  FTC Guidance, supra note 197, at 7. 
 216.  Id. 
 217.  Id. (giving the example that, “a licensed dentist is deemed to be an active market 
participant regardless of whether the dentist (i) is appointed to the state dental board by the 
governor or (ii) is elected to the state dental board by the state’s licensed dentists”). 
 218.  Id. at 8–9.  
 219.  Id. 
 220.  Id. at 8–9 (noting that if an active market participant’s vote is essentially required for a 
regulation to become effective, active market participants effectively have veto power).  
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The FTC details an aggressive stance for the active state supervision 
requirement.221  In its guidance, the FTC relies on the few constant 
requirements identified by the Supreme Court.222  Articulating some broad 
but informative principles, the FTC generally implies that the active state 
supervision analysis is “context-dependent” and, overall, the State’s 
supervision must ensure that the anticompetitive conduct is the State’s own 
such that the “States accept political accountability for anticompetitive 
conduct.”223  However, the FTC then goes further, requiring an exacting 
analysis of 1) whether the supervisor obtained the necessary information, 
such as facts and data assembled by the board, conducted public hearings, 
invited and reviewed public comments, conducted studies, and reviewed 
documentary evidence, to make a proper evaluation of the action, 2) 
whether the supervisor evaluated the “substantive merits” of the 
recommended action and whether it “comports with the standards 
established by the state legislature,” and 3) whether the supervisor has 
issued a written decision with his or her rationale for the decision regarding 
the board’s action.224  The FTC also recommends that, in order to avoid 
conflicts with antitrust laws, states could create regulatory boards that only 
serve in an advisory capacity or could staff boards with non-active market 
participants.225 
The FTC’s guidance is not realistic, considering the current status of 
state regulatory boards.  In practice, state regulatory boards are generally 
dominated by active participants.226  A recent study found that active 
market participants have a majority on ninety percent of boards in Florida 
and on ninety-three percent of boards in Tennessee.227  For the most part, 
active market participants are best able to regulate their professions and to 
consider what may place the welfare of the public at stake.228  For example, 
                                                          
 221.  Compare supra Part IV.B.1 (discussing the Court’s unclear stance for adequate state 
supervision), with FTC Guidance, supra note 197, at 9–11 (indicating that only a significant 
amount of supervision by the State will be sufficient). 
 222.  FTC Guidance, supra note 197, at 9 (“The supervisor must review the substance of the 
anticompetitive decision, not merely the procedures followed to produce it; the supervisor must 
have the power to veto or modify particular decision to ensure they accord with state policy; and 
the ‘mere potential for state supervision is not an adequate substitute for a decision by the State.’  
Further, the state supervisor may not itself be an active market participant.” (quoting N.C. State 
Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1116–17)). 
 223.  Id. at 9–10 (quoting N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1111). 
 224.  Id. at 10. 
 225.  Id. at 1. 
 226.  Edlin & Haw, supra note 209, at 1095, 1103. 
 227.  Id. at 1103, 1157–64. 
 228.  See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1122–23 (2015) (Alito, J., 
dissenting) (underscoring that “[i]t is reasonable for States to decide that the individuals best able 
to regulate technical professions are practitioners with expertise in those very professions” and 
that staffing a board with non-market participants who do not have expertise in the field “would 
also compromise the State’s interest in sensibly regulating a technical profession”). 
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licensing requirements, and other barriers to entry, may serve as an attempt 
to cure market inefficiencies.229  Some anticompetitive actions can be 
beneficial by curing inefficiencies, that often result from information 
asymmetry, in the name of the public interest.230  Some professions have 
been self-regulated for years, such as dentists and doctors, requiring specific 
expertise to regulate their profession in order to protect the public from 
harm.231  Consequently, self-regulation and practitioner dominated 
regulatory boards are inevitable, and these boards will have to show 
sufficient active state supervision in order to invoke Parker immunity. 
The FTC erred on the side of idealism in its guidance, but the FTC’s 
idealistic requirements for active state supervision are not practical for the 
states.  In implementing the FTC’s guidelines, a state agent must not only 
review the substance of a board’s anticompetitive decision but also engage 
in activities amounting to the level of the promulgation of a regulation: the 
agency must hold public hearings for anyone affected by the board’s 
intended actions, as well as obtain and verify published studies, data, and 
information on the specifics and the effects of action, in order for a state 
board to invoke Parker immunity.232   
Many state regulatory board decisions are in the realm of licensing, 
which in and of itself creates a barrier to entry into a specific market.233  
Consequently, a board’s actions will implicate antitrust laws.  As detailed 
above, since most boards are practitioner dominated and subject to the 
                                                          
 229.  See Elhauge, supra note 177, at 668–69 (“The motivation for such anticompetitive state 
and local regulation can range from the benign to the insidious: correcting economic inefficiencies 
resulting from market failures, furthering noneconomic conceptions of the public interest, or 
garnering monopoly profits for powerful interest groups that have captured the regulators.”). 
 230.  See id. at 702 (“Another body of economic literature establishes the potential for 
furthering the public interest by regulating and restraining competition to correct market 
imperfections.”); Edlin & Haw, supra note 209, at 1107, 1111 (“For some professions, licensing 
provides such an obvious public benefit that barriers to entry and regulation of practice are 
accepted as necessary evils. . . . State professional boards arose from the belief that, for some 
professions, inexpert practice would be socially inefficient or even dangerous.  Licensing created a 
mechanism by which the government could prevent incompetent practitioners from 
participating.”). 
 231.  See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1122–23. (“[M]edical and dental 
boards have been staffed by practitioners since they were first created, and there are obvious 
advantages to this approach.”); see also Edlin & Haw, supra note 209, at 1140 (“[P]ractitioner 
dominance is inevitable.  Tailoring restrictions to benefit the public . . . usually requires 
experience in the profession.  Laypersons are generally unable to make judgments about the 
quality and risks of professional service. . . .  But the need for expertise creates a problem: those 
who have the most to gain from reduced consumer welfare . . . are tasked with protecting 
consumer welfare in the form of health and safety—the fox guards the henhouse.”). 
 232.  FTC Guidance, supra note 197, at 11–12 (detailing an example of satisfactory active 
supervision of a state board regulation). 
 233.  Edlin & Haw, supra note 209, at 1096, 1107, 1112, (stating that professional licensing 
can act as a barrier to entry into the profession but noting that “[f]or some professions, licensing 
provides such an obvious public benefit that barriers to entry and regulation practice are accepted 
as necessary evils,” while other restrictions are an abuse of the authority to regulate). 
 70 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES [VOL. 75:44 
active state supervision requirement, there is concern that every decision 
made by regulatory boards may be subject to direct oversight and approval 
by state employees for many of the board’s actions.234  Yet, state agencies 
and sub-state entities are notoriously understaffed and lack sufficient 
resources to engage in the oversight the FTC is trying to extract.235  States 
routinely delegate their authority to state regulatory boards, in order to 
overcome resource burdens.  Therefore, the FTC’s guiding principles and 
factors for active state supervision are unrealistic, and likely never to be 
satisfied. 
3.  Within the Realm of Anticompetitive Decisions, Regulatory 
Boards Are Effectively Advisory Boards to Invoke State Action 
Immunity 
Following North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners, 
regulatory boards have limited options to avoid federal antitrust liability.  In 
order to avoid active state supervision, states could decide to change the 
composition of state boards by not requiring a majority of active market 
participants.236  Boards could also avoid decisions implicating federal 
antitrust liability.237  However, as discussed in Part IV.B.2, these options 
are unrealistic.238  While the FTC recommends that a state legislature 
“generally should [] prefer that a regulatory board be subject to the 
requirements of the federal antitrust laws,” in practice, this could serve as a 
                                                          
 234.  Speech, Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Commissioner, U.S. Federal Trade Commission, 
Reflections on the Supreme Court’s North Carolina Dental Decision and the FTC’s Campaign to 
Rein in State Action Immunity 14 (Mar. 31, 2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/634091/150403hertiagedental.pdf 
(quoting Brief of Amici Curiae State of West Virginia and 21 Other States in Support of Petitioner 
at 15, N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) (No. 13-534)). 
 235.  Michal Dlouhy, Note, Judicial Review as Midcal Active Supervision: Immunizing Private 
Parties from Antitrust Liability, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 403, 414 (“Even when a strict supervision 
requirement is imposed only on delegation of state authority to private parties, it requires costly 
supervision and limits the methods a state may employ to implement a program of regulation.”); 
see, e.g., Editorial, State Agencies Dangerously Understaffed, Dependent on Overtime, TULSA 
WORLD (June 25, 2015), http://www.tulsaworld.com/opinion/editorials/tulsa-world-editorial-state-
agencies-dangerously-understaffed-dependent-on-overtime/article_52c4ac37-85fe-5f16-b3eb-
428a1fc69f23.html (underscoring that state agencies were dangerously understaffed leading to 
$32.5 million in overtime in 2014); Rupa Shenoy, Understaffed and Underfunded, State Medical 
Examiner Backlogs Swell, WGBH NEWS (May 16, 2014), 
https://news.wgbh.org/post/understaffed-and-underfunded-state-medical-examiner-backlogs-swell 
(reporting that following “a series of scandals involving piles of unclaimed bodies and pools of 
blood on autopsy-room floors” the Massachusetts’ Medical Examiner’s Office still did not have 
the staff nor the financial resources necessary to fulfill its duties). 
 236.  FTC Guidance, supra note 197, at 1; Ohlhausen, supra note 234, at 15. 
 237.  Ohlhausen, supra note 234, at 15. 
 238.  See supra notes 226–235 and accompanying text.  
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deterrent for many potential board members.239  Consequently, if states 
want to staff their boards with active market participants, who know best 
how to regulate their field, boards must submit to the stringent active state 
supervision requirements in the hopes of invoking state action immunity.240  
If a state undertakes to meet the FTC’s stringent guidelines, the board is 
effectively submitting a recommendation.241  In light of this, there is little 
difference between the federal rulemaking process and the active state 
supervision requirement.242  Essentially, state regulatory boards have been 
stripped of the authority vested by the State, leaving them powerless to 
effectuate any agenda, whether state sanctioned or privately interested, that 
may have anticompetitive effects.  Thus, the FTC’s decision as to what 
constitutes enough active state supervision effectively renders state boards 
as solely advisory bodies. 
4.  Enough Supervision Should Be Enough When There Is an 
Independent Review Commission 
Given the Supreme Court’s ruling in North Carolina State Board of 
Dental Examiners that the active state supervision requirement applies to 
state regulatory boards with a “controlling number of active market 
participants,” states may have to make changes to their regulatory 
structures.243  Scholars have debated the value of the active state 
supervision requirement and have proposed differing solutions.244  Notably, 
                                                          
 239.  FTC Guidance, supra note 197, at 2–3; Ortbahn, supra note 214, at 12–13 (stating that 
“[t]his puts professionals who serve on boards in an awkward position . . . professionals are likely 
to be put off by the potential for personal antitrust liability” and refuse to continue to serve on 
boards). 
 240.  See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1114 (2015) (requiring 
both prongs of the Midcal test). 
 241.  See supra notes 232–235 and accompanying text. 
 242.  Compare OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, A GUIDE TO THE RULEMAKING PROCESS 
(2011), https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf, with FTC 
Guidance, supra note 197, at 9–11 (delineating the FTC’s standard for sufficient active state 
supervision). 
 243.  David J. Owsiany, Federalism Implications of Applying Federal Antitrust Scrutiny to 
State Licensing Boards, 15 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 27, 29, n.65 (2014) 
(“States would be forced to make sweeping changes to their licensing and regulatory structures, 
impacting dozens of boards in each state” and potentially impacting over a third of the Nation’s 
workforce. (citing Edlin & Haw, supra note 209, at 1144)). 
 244.  See Edlin & Haw, supra note 209, at 1144, 1146, 1148, 1150 (contending that the active 
state supervision requirement should apply to licensing boards but that “courts should apply a 
modified rule-of reason analysis in licensing cases” that would allow licensing boards to cite 
public safety and quality enhancement justifications).  But see Elhauge, supra note 177, at 695 
(arguing that “the Court should dispense with the potentially misleading supervision requirement 
altogether” in favor of a simplified test where “state action immunity applies only when a 
financially disinterested state official controls the terms of the challenged restraint”); William H. 
Page, State Action and “Active Supervision”: an Antitrust Anomaly, 35 ANTITRUST BULL. 745, 
769–70 (1990) (arguing that “[t]he Court should abandon its concern with supervision” and focus 
on the clear articulation requirement); John Shepard Wiley Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust 
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many scholars highlight public participation as a fundamental premise for 
state action immunity, in order to ensure that a board’s anticompetitive 
actions are in the public’s interest.245  However, public participation in state 
board affairs is typically low.246  Furthermore, any solution must consider 
the current status of regulatory boards and balance the role of state 
regulatory boards, to which the State has delegated its authority, with the 
concern for the self-interested nature of active market participants. 
In lieu of the complex and exhaustive set of requirements designated 
by the FTC, states should appoint an independent review commission.  The 
independent review commission would review potential anticompetitive 
actions by state boards, determine whether a seemingly anticompetitive 
action serves the public interest or remedies any market inefficiencies, and 
issue written approval or exercise its veto power.  This independent body 
would only need to apply a simple, but active, review of the evidence 
presented and exercise their independent judgment as to the reasonableness 
of a board’s actions.  In turn, states would still have the flexibility to 
delegate authority to state regulatory boards, allowing boards to fulfill their 
governmental role without fear of antitrust scrutiny.247 
While how to staff and set up these commissions should be left to the 
states in the interest of state sovereignty, the procedures used should 
safeguard that none of the members are financially interested or market 
participants, and further afford members who have a personal stake in a 
                                                          
Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 731–39 (1986) (rejecting the active state supervision prong 
and proposing a preemption test, evaluating whether a board’s actions were in fact a result of 
regulatory capture).  This is not an exhaustive list.   
 245.  See William H. Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process: A 
Reconstruction and Critique of the State Action Exemption after Midcal Aluminum, 61 B.U. L. 
REV. 1099, 1117 (1981) (“Through this application of the Parker doctrine, the Court sought to 
assure the existence of valid popular consent as a prerequisite to coercive and arguable 
anticompetitive use of state power.”); cf. Thomas Jorde, Antitrust and the New State Action 
Doctrine: A Return to the Deferential Economic Federalism, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 227, 249–50 
(1987) (arguing that active supervision provides an opportunity for citizen participation, since 
“although the public is able to participate in the initial decision to delegate regulatory authority, 
that is not the critical point at which decisions are made”).   
 246.  Edlin & Haw, supra note 209, at 1139–40 (“While most states’ sunshine laws require 
publication of minutes and require board meetings to be open to the public, only members 
typically attend.  Individual consumers lack the incentive . . . [and] rarely would it be rational for a 
consumer to take the time and effort to try and change a licensing rule . . . lobbying groups could 
theoretically fill this void . . . but public choice theory illustrates that meaningful consumer 
participation in the political process is difficult even with this mechanism.” (first citing Clark C. 
Havinghurst, Contesting Anticompetitive Actions Taken in the Name of the State: State Action 
Immunity and Health Care Markets, 31 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 587, 596 (2006); then citing 
N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 151 F.T.C. 607, 626 (2011); then citing FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 286.011 (West 2012); then citing TENN. CODE. ANN. §§ 8-44-102, 104 (West 2012); and then 
citing Ginevra Bruzzone, Deregulation of Structurally Competitive Services: Economic Analysis 
and Competition Advocacy, in THE ANTICOMPETITIVE IMPACT OF REGULATION 5, 21 (Giuliano 
Amato & Laraine L. Laudati eds., 2001))).  
 247.  See supra note 239 and accompanying text. 
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particular board’s actions the ability to recuse themselves.248  States may 
choose to appoint or elect citizens to the independent review commission, 
but should ensure that these individuals are subject to the political process, 
in order to garner the necessary public participation249 and political 
accountability.250 
To illustrate the possibility of an independent review commission, it is 
informative to examine California’s recent appointment of an independent 
reapportionment commission, the California Citizens Redistricting 
Commission (“Commission”).251  Notably, legislators acting out of self-
interest have the incentive to draw district lines in a manner that ensures 
reelection.252  California citizens tried and were indeed successful in 
removing the influence of self-interested elected officials by appointing an 
independent commission.253  The Commission is composed of fourteen 
members, with five members from the state’s largest political party, five 
members from the next largest political party, and four members from 
minor parties or with no party affiliation.254  Furthermore, the voting 
structure of the Commission seeks independence by requiring at least three 
votes from all three groups of commissioners.255  Additionally, the 
Commission’s system seeks to heighten public participation.256  Thus, 
setting up an independent review commission that serves a similar purpose 
to these redistricting commissions is indeed possible.257 
An independent review commission would satisfy the active state 
supervision requirements articulated by the Supreme Court.258  However, 
                                                          
 248.  See Elhauge, supra note 177, at 697–702 (arguing that the issue lies in distrust in 
financially interested decisionmaking). 
 249.  See supra notes 245–246 and accompanying text. 
 250.  See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1111 (2015) (requiring 
that states “accept political accountability for anticompetitive conduct they permit and control”). 
 251.  Angelo N. Ancheta, Redistricting Reform and the California Citizens Redistricting 
Commission, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 109, 109 (2014).  
 252.  Id.  
 253.  Id. at 110.  
 254.  Id. at 116 (citing CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(c)(2)). 
 255.  Id. at 116–17 (citing CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(c)(5)). 
 256.  Id. at 127 (“The Commission system is designed to open up the process, not only by 
empowering citizens to make the redistricting decisions, but by creating structures that ensure 
participation and limit decision making outside of the public eye.”).   
 257.  Furthermore, the Supreme Court upheld the appointment of the Arizona Independent 
Redistricting Commission, holding that the U.S. Constitution permits commissions established by 
popular vote to draw Congressional voting districts.  Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. 
Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015).  For the Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission, five members are selected from a list of candidates compiled by Arizona’s 
Commission on Appellate Court Appointments and only serve for one redistricting cycle.  Id. at 
2661. 
 258.  Namely, a supervisor must not be an active market participant, must actually review the 
substance of the actions, must have the power to veto or modify the decision, and must not merely 
have the potential to review a board’s decision.  See supra notes 201–205 and accompanying text. 
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this body would relieve the states from the cumbersome FTC requirements, 
such as copious public hearings and vast information gathering efforts.259 
Consequently, approval by an independent review commission accords with 
the central concern of restricting the application of the state action doctrine 
to only when “the anticompetitive scheme is the State’s own.”260 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade 
Commission, the United States Supreme Court concluded that state 
regulatory boards with a controlling number of active market participants 
are subject to both the clear articulation and active state supervision 
requirements of the Midcal test, in order to invoke state action immunity.261  
Although the Court came to the correct holding, that a state regulatory 
board must prove both Midcal prongs and the Board’s actions did not 
warrant Parker immunity,262 the Court did not articulate clear guidance as 
to what would constitute sufficient active state supervision.263  The Court’s 
inability to give direct guidance, coupled with the FTC’s exacting 
requirements for active state supervision, have effectively reduced state 
regulatory boards to advisory boards for anticompetitive actions, in order to 
invoke Parker immunity.264  In order to overcome the cumbersome FTC 
requirements by proposing that states set up and independent review 
commission, this Note seeks to balance a state board’s interest in being able 
to effectively fulfill their statutory purpose with the public’s interest in 
ensuring that the board’s actions serve the general welfare.265 
                                                          
 259.  See supra notes 224, 232 and accompanying text. 
 260.  FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 635 (1992). 
 261.  N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1114 (2015). 
 262.  Id. at 1117; see supra Part IV.A. 
 263.  See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 264.  See supra Parts IV.B.2–3. 
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